A Crisis of the Opposition or a Crisis of Political Legitimacy?

The political landscape in Turkey has changed significantly following the absolute nullity ruling.

The government's efforts to destabilize the main opposition party have succeeded within a system where the principle of separation of powers has largely disappeared. This process has altered not only the internal balance within the CHP but also the nature of political competition in Turkey.

Suspicions that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was acting in concert with the government had been growing among opposition voters throughout the thirteen elections that were lost under his leadership. At the point reached today, many voters regard those suspicions as having effectively been confirmed.

Under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, the CHP had been moved substantially to the right. The "purification" being discussed today has no ideological dimension whatsoever. It is impossible for the rhetoric of purification to generate a positive response among CHP voters. For a large segment of the electorate, the issue is no longer who will come to power but rather the desire to see the AKP leave power. The collapse of the hope represented by the CHP, which emerged as the largest party in the most recent local elections, has created profound psychological disappointment and anger among the public.

Turkey's greatest problem is the severe damage inflicted upon the mechanisms that generate political legitimacy. Democratic systems do not survive solely through elections. They survive through a collective belief that electoral competition is fair, that the opposition can act independently, that the judiciary remains outside political processes, and that governments can genuinely be replaced. In recent years, this is precisely the element that has eroded in Turkey.

A significant portion of opposition voters now approach not only election results but the political process itself with suspicion. The belief that even the internal dynamics of opposition parties are not independent of external intervention is becoming increasingly widespread. This situation is undermining the foundations of political legitimacy. Democracy is sustained not only by legal procedures but also by a sense of public trust. When trust erodes, political legitimacy weakens even if the system continues to function formally. For this reason, the current crisis is not merely an internal matter for the CHP. The real issue is the extent to which political competition in Turkey is perceived as genuine competition.

It now appears extremely difficult for a large segment of opposition voters to find Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's statements targeting the government credible. Many voters no longer view Kılıçdaroğlu as a political actor struggling against the government but rather as a controlled component of the existing order. Consequently, his criticisms of the government will increasingly be regarded by broad sections of the electorate as part of a political theater. For opposition voters, the issue is no longer the words being spoken but the practical consequences of political positions.

The political structure emerging in Turkey increasingly resembles what political science literature describes as "competitive authoritarianism." In such systems, elections do not disappear entirely. However, state power begins to be used asymmetrically in favor of those in government.

There is a strong possibility that the next election will take place between the AKP and a CHP led by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Given the constraints of time, it appears highly unlikely that Özgür Özel and his team could prepare for an election through a newly established party.

The likelihood of an extraordinary party congress within the CHP in the short term also appears low. It is evident that a CHP leadership acting in concert with the government would seek to postpone any congress for as long as possible.

All conditions point to a situation in which no strong alternative to the AKP remains available for the first election. Under these circumstances, there is a strong possibility that a CHP led by Kılıçdaroğlu would suffer a heavy defeat in the next election.

But even if Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is correct on certain points, can the method he has chosen be defended morally? Absolutely not. I examined my assessment of this issue in detail in a previous article: Turkey's Biggest Problem: The CHP Won the Election.

The first election is likely to be lost. However, in the period that follows, the political prospects of Özgür Özel's team may improve. Turkish political history contains many examples of movements that, after finding themselves in a victimized position, eventually regained strength over time.

In summary, for voters seeking a change in government, the short-term political outlook offers little cause for optimism. In the medium and long term, however, provided that Turkish democracy does not suffer damage beyond what can currently even be imagined, the potential for outcomes favorable to the opposition already exists today. The advantage of age is also on the side of Özgür Özel and his team.