A Text-Internal Study of Legal Authority in the Qur’an

Introduction

It is often argued that Islam is inherently political because the Qur’an contains law. Scholars of Islamic political thought have long noted that the Qur’an integrates legal normativity into revelation, thereby blurring distinctions between religious and political authority.

If divine revelation regulates inheritance, contracts, punishment, adjudication, and authority, then religion and governance appear inseparable. From this perspective, the expression “political Islam” would seem redundant. Islam would already be political by virtue of its foundational text. Yet the label political Islam has its own modern genealogy and is not merely a description of scriptural normativity.

This claim, however, raises deeper questions.

• Does the presence of legal prescriptions in the Qur’an amount to a complete and self-sufficient legal system?

• Does divine revelation eliminate interpretive mediation?

• If believers are required to accept the Qur’an in its entirety, what are the implications for legal pluralism and secular neutrality?

Modern scholarship distinguishes between the Qur’an as a source of normative principles and the later development of comprehensive Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).

This article examines these questions strictly through the Qur’an itself. It argues three interrelated points.

• First, the Qur’an undeniably embeds binding legal normativity within revelation.

• Second, the Qur’an explicitly differentiates between determinate and ambiguous verses, thereby structurally necessitating interpretive engagement.

• Third, although the Qur’an does not articulate a fully enumerated administrative code, it establishes a hierarchy of normative authority in which divine law cannot be subordinated to human legislation for believers.

This hierarchy generates a structural tension with any legal order that seeks religious neutrality.

The Qur’an does not provide:

• A modern theory of sovereignty.

• A constitutional blueprint.

• A fully enumerated criminal code.

• An institutional theory of secularism.

All citations in this article follow M. A. S. Abdel Haleem’s translation (Oxford University Press).

Defining Secularism in Normative Terms

Before assessing the compatibility between Qur’anic authority and secular order, the term secularism must be defined precisely.

Secularism can denote several distinct models. It may refer to state atheism, to institutional separation between religious and political authorities, or to social irreligiosity. None of these meanings captures the specific issue at stake in this study.

In the present analysis, secularism is understood in a narrower and more structural sense: a legal-political order in which ultimate normative authority resides in human legislation rather than in divine revelation. In such an order, laws derive their binding force from human sovereignty.

This definition aligns with accounts of secularism that emphasize legislative sovereignty and the relocation of ultimate normativity from divine to human authority. Some scholars caution that secularism is historically contingent rather than reducible to a single structural principle. Religious norms may inform individual conscience, but they do not function as normatively supreme public law.

Under this definition, the central question is not whether religious belief may exist within society, nor whether religious institutions may operate independently. The question is whether divine legislation can be subordinated to, modified by, or suspended in favor of autonomous human law.

If secularism entails the supremacy of human legislative sovereignty over revealed law, then such a model becomes structurally incompatible with a theology that affirms the immutability and normative supremacy of divine command in the Qur'anic context.

The Legal Architecture of the Qur’an

The Qur’an contains binding legal directives. Norm-setting appears in categorical form:

“You who believe, fulfil your obligations.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Māʾidah 5:1)

The imperative establishes enforceable obligation. This is juridical language.

Economic injustice is prohibited in similarly legal terms:

“Do not consume one another’s property unjustly, nor use it to bribe officials in order to consume a portion of other people’s property wrongfully and knowingly.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:188)

The verse regulates property relations and corruption. It presupposes a normative legal order.

The clearest example of codified distributive law appears in inheritance:

“Concerning your children, God commands you that a son should have the equivalent share of two daughters…” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Nisāʾ 4:11)

The verse continues with precise fractional allocations and concludes by describing these shares as “a commandment from God.” This is not metaphorical guidance but quantified legislation.

Procedural regulation is evident in the debt verse:

“When you contract a debt for a fixed period, put it in writing…” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:282)

The verse proceeds to regulate documentation, witnessing, and evidentiary safeguards. This resembles codified commercial procedure.

The debt verse (2:282) has been described as a foundational example of procedural normativity embedded within revelation.

Penal provisions reinforce the legal character of the text:

“As for male and female thieves, cut off their hands as punishment for what they have done…” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Māʾidah 5:38)

And:

“If any of your women commit adultery, call four witnesses…” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Nisāʾ 4:15)

Finally, adjudicative authority is explicitly mandated:

“God commands you to return things entrusted to you to their rightful owners, and, if you judge between people, to judge with justice.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Nisāʾ 4:58)

Taken together, these passages demonstrate that the Qur’an embeds legal normativity within revelation. It regulates property, family relations, penal sanctions, commercial practice, and adjudication. Religion and law are not separated in the text.

Scholars widely acknowledge that the Qur’an contains explicit legal rulings (aḥkām) that function as binding normative directives rather than merely ethical exhortations.

Textual Differentiation and Interpretive Structure

The presence of legal norms does not eliminate interpretive necessity. The Qur’an explicitly distinguishes between types of verses:

“It is He who has sent down to you the Book. Some of its verses are definite in meaning—these are the cornerstone of the Book—and others are ambiguous.” (Qur’an, Sūrat Āl ʿImrān 3:7)

The text acknowledges internal differentiation. Some verses are muḥkamāt (definite), and others are mutashābihāt (ambiguous). The Qur’an does not present itself as uniformly transparent.

Classical and modern exegetes alike have interpreted 3:7 as establishing a hermeneutical distinction between determinate and ambiguous verses, thereby embedding interpretive reasoning within the structure of revelation.

It also commands reflective engagement:

“Will they not reflect on the Qur’an?” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Nisāʾ 4:82)

Reflection implies interpretation. Even within the legal corpus, degrees of determinacy vary. Inheritance shares are numerically fixed.

By contrast:

“Do not hold them against their will with the intention of causing harm.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:231)

“Harm” is binding but semantically open. Its application requires judgment.

Likewise:

“Judge with justice.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Nisāʾ 4:58)

Justice is obligatory yet not mathematically specified. The Qur’an combines fixed allocations with evaluative standards. Interpretation is therefore structurally embedded within obedience.

Total Submission and the Rejection of Selective Belief

If the Qur’an contains binding legal directives, can believers treat them as optional within a broader legal framework?

The Qur’an strongly condemns selective belief:

“Do you believe in part of the Scripture and disbelieve in part?” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:85)

This rhetorical question is followed by condemnation of such division:

“Those who disbelieve in God and His messengers and wish to make a distinction between God and His messengers, saying, ‘We believe in some but reject others,’ seeking a middle way, those are really disbelievers.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Nisāʾ 4:150–151)

Belief in revelation is comprehensive, not selective.

This is reinforced by the statement:

“It is not for a believing man or woman, when God and His Messenger have decided a matter, to have any choice in their affair.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Aḥzāb 33:36).

The verse explicitly limits autonomous decision once divine command is known.

The Qur’an affirms the immutability of divine words:

“The word of your Lord is perfected in truth and justice. No one can change His words.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Anʿām 6:115)

If divine prescriptions are unalterable, they cannot be overridden by human preference.

Furthermore, adjudication must conform to revelation:

“Those who do not judge according to what God has sent down are rejecting God’s teachings.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Māʾidah 5:44)

And:

“Judge between them according to what God has sent down…” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Māʾidah 5:48)

“Who is better in judgment than God for people who are certain in faith?”

(Qur’an, Sūrat al-Māʾidah 5:50)

These verses have historically been central to debates over divine sovereignty (ḥākimiyya) and the obligation to govern according to revelation.

These verses establish normative supremacy of revelation.

Normative Hierarchy and the Limits of Secular Neutrality

It is important to clarify that the Qur’an does not articulate a detailed theory of sovereign state structure. It does not present a constitutional framework, define branches of government, or describe a comprehensive institutional design. The text contains no systematic political theory comparable to later formulations of sovereignty in Western political thought. However, the absence of institutional specification does not imply normative indeterminacy.

While the Qur’an leaves the form of governance structurally open, it does not leave ultimate authority open. The decisive issue is not administrative architecture but the source of binding law. The text consistently affirms that judgment must conform to what God has revealed and that divine words are unchangeable.

The Qur’anic declaration that “judgment belongs to God alone” (12:40) has been widely interpreted as affirming divine legislative supremacy, a principle later developed in Islamic legal and political thought.

The source of binding authority is therefore explicitly anchored in divine command rather than in autonomous human will.

The Qur’an does not provide a fully enumerated administrative blueprint. It does not detail every institutional structure required for complex modern societies. However, absence of institutional specification does not imply normative relativisation.

From the internal logic of the text:

• Revelation contains binding law.

• Belief must be total, not partial.

• Divine words are unchangeable.

• Judgment must conform to revelation.

Together, these elements generate a structure of normative supremacy rather than mere moral guidance. Therefore, even if supplementary regulatory systems exist, they cannot invalidate or suspend Qur’anic prescriptions for believers. This creates a hierarchy of authority. Divine law remains normatively superior.

The Qur’an also frames life itself as wholly oriented toward God:

“Say, ‘Indeed, my prayer, my sacrifice, my living and my dying are for God, Lord of the worlds.’” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Anʿām 6:162)

Life is not compartmentalised into sacred and secular domains. It is consecrated in totality.

Thus, even if civil law operates alongside Qur’anic law, believers cannot treat divine prescriptions as private symbolism. They retain binding force.

“It is not for a believing man or woman, when God and His Messenger have decided a matter, to have any choice in their affair.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Aḥzāb 33:36)

If secular neutrality is defined as the state’s indifference toward religious legal claims, then a community religiously obligated to uphold specific divine norms cannot fully internalise that neutrality. The tension arises not from political ideology but from theological structure.

There Is No Compulsion in Religion

One verse frequently invoked in discussions of religion and political authority appears to complicate the foregoing argument:

“There is no compulsion in religion: true guidance has become distinct from error.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:256)

At first glance, this statement appears to support a model of religious non-coercion that might align with modern secular neutrality. However, a strictly text-internal reading clarifies its scope.

Modern scholars differ on whether 2:256 implies political non-coercion or merely theological voluntariness. However, many acknowledge that the verse addresses entry into faith rather than the suspension of internal normative obligations.

First, the verse addresses compulsion in religion. That is, coerced belief. The statement is declarative: faith cannot be forced. The reason immediately follows: “true guidance has become distinct from error.” The clarity of revelation eliminates the need for coercion. Faith must be embraced freely because truth has been made manifest.

Second, the verse does not state that obedience to divine law is optional once belief is chosen. The Qur’an consistently links belief to submission. The very term islām denotes submission. The Qur’an states:

“The only true religion in God’s eyes is Islam.” (Qur’an, Sūrat Āl ʿImrān 3:19)

And elsewhere:

“When his Lord said to him, ‘Submit,’ he said, ‘I submit myself to the Lord of the worlds.’” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:131)

Submission, once chosen, is comprehensive.

Thus, 2:256 establishes freedom of entry into faith, not freedom from its obligations. The Qur’an does not compel belief, but once belief is affirmed, obedience is not treated as selective or negotiable. This is reinforced by the condemnation of partial acceptance:

“Do you believe in part of the Scripture and disbelieve in part?” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:85)

The text therefore distinguishes between the voluntariness of faith and the obligatoriness of submission once faith is affirmed.

The Qur’an also differentiates between those inside and outside the believing community. Its legal prescriptions are consistently directed to “You who believe.” The binding force of divine law is addressed to believers. Thus, 2:256 does not dissolve the normative hierarchy established in previous sections. It clarifies that faith must be voluntary, but it does not reduce divine legislation to private ethics.

Consequently, the verse does not negate the internal logic already established: revelation contains binding law, belief must be total, divine words are immutable, judgment must conform to what God has revealed. The absence of compulsion in entering religion does not imply the absence of obligation within it.

Universality, Accessibility, Interpretation, and Authority

The Qur’an repeatedly presents itself as universal in scope:

“We have not sent you except as a mercy to all the worlds.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ 21:107)

“This is a message for all people, so that they may be warned by it.” (Qur’an, Sūrat Ibrāhīm 14:52)

It also addresses humanity directly:

“O mankind, worship your Lord, who created you and those before you, so that you may be mindful.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:21)

“This Qur’an has been revealed to me so that I may warn you and whoever it reaches.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Anʿām 6:19)

Universality, however, raises a fundamental question. If revelation is for all people, then its essential guidance must be accessible. A religion addressed to all humanity cannot depend exclusively on academic or elite mediation. If only specialists could understand its normative demands, universality would become formal rather than substantive.

The Qur’an itself affirms clarity:

“We have certainly made the Qur’an easy to remember: so is there anyone who will remember?” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Qamar 54:17)

“A Book whose verses have been made clear…” (Qur’an, Sūrat Hūd 11:1)

At the same time, the Qur’an acknowledges internal differentiation:

“Some of its verses are definite in meaning—these are the cornerstone of the Book—and others are ambiguous.” (Qur’an, Sūrat Āl ʿImrān 3:7)

The Qur’an’s self-description as clear (mubīn) and accessible has been interpreted as grounding its universal normative claims beyond elite mediation.

This structure indicates that universality does not eliminate interpretive depth. Certain norms are numerically and linguistically determinate, such as inheritance allocations or specified legal prohibitions. Other norms are principle-based, such as justice, harm, fairness, and social responsibility. These require contextual judgment.

Thus, the Qur’an simultaneously affirms accessibility and interpretive engagement. It does not restrict understanding to a clerical class. Nor does it eliminate the need for reasoning in application. Yet interpretation introduces a further question: if human beings must interpret divine law in order to apply it, who holds authority in cases of disagreement? If authority exists, does it amount to sovereignty?

The Qur’an addresses adjudication directly:

“God commands you… if you judge between people, to judge with justice.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Nisāʾ 4:58)

“Judge between them according to what God has sent down…” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Māʾidah 5:48)

Authority in the Qur’anic framework is not autonomous law-making power. It is derivative and bounded.

The Qur’an acknowledges authority structures:

“Obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you.” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Nisāʾ 4:59).

Yet the same verse immediately stipulates that in cases of disagreement, matters must be “referred back to God and the Messenger.” Authority therefore exists, but it remains derivative and normatively subordinate.

Judgment is required, but judgment must conform to revelation. Human authority operates within divine limits. It does not replace divine legislation.

This distinction is crucial. Interpretation does not imply legislative sovereignty. It implies mediated application of an already established normative order. The interpreter may clarify, extend, or contextualize, but may not overturn or suspend what the text presents as binding command.

In this sense, universality does not eliminate governance, and interpretation does not generate secular sovereignty. The Qur’an leaves the institutional form of authority open, but it does not leave the source of ultimate normativity open. Human adjudication functions under divine supremacy, not alongside it as an equal source of law.

The social order envisioned by the Qur’an therefore rests on a layered structure:

• Foundational norms revealed and binding.

• Interpretive engagement permitted and required.

• Adjudicative authority necessary.

• Ultimate legislative supremacy anchored in revelation.

Under this structure, disagreement does not dissolve divine authority. Nor does interpretive mediation transfer sovereignty to human will. Authority exists, but it is constrained authority. Governance exists, but it is normatively subordinate.

If secularism is defined as the autonomy of human legislative sovereignty independent of revealed command, then the Qur’anic model of universality and authority does not align with it. The text envisions interpretive diversity within a fixed hierarchy, not normative neutrality between divine and human law.

Delegated authority, by definition, derives its legitimacy from the source that authorizes it. In the Qur’anic framework, human adjudication does not create law independently. It applies and administers what revelation establishes as normatively binding.

Normative Supremacy and Legislative Sovereignty

If “judgment belongs to God alone” (Qur’an, Sūrat Yūsuf 12:40), and if believers are instructed to “judge between them according to what God has sent down” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Māʾidah 5:48), then the ultimate source of binding normativity is not human will but divine revelation.

The Qur’an further states that when “God and His Messenger have decided a matter,” believers “have no choice in their affair” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Aḥzāb 33:36).

These formulations do not merely provide moral exhortation. They establish a hierarchy in which divine command occupies the position of final legislative authority.

Under this framework, human adjudication exists, interpretation exists, and governance exists. Yet all such authority remains derivative. Even in domains not explicitly regulated in the text, legitimacy must trace back to divine authorization rather than autonomous human sovereignty. Delegated authority does not constitute independent sovereignty. It functions within boundaries defined by revelation.

If secularism is defined as a legal-political order in which ultimate normative authority resides in human legislation independent of revealed command, then such a model cannot be reconciled with the Qur’anic structure of supremacy. The incompatibility does not arise from hostility toward religion, nor from historical developments, but from the hierarchy embedded in the text itself.

Universality and the Ordinary Believer

The foregoing analysis has focused strictly on the internal structure of the Qur’anic text. It has not evaluated historical practice, juristic developments, or modern political adaptations. It has asked only what follows if the Qur’an’s claims about law, authority, and submission are taken seriously on their own terms.

If the Qur’an is a message “for all people” (Qur’an, Sūrat Ibrāhīm 14:52), and if it has been made “easy to remember” (Qur’an, Sūrat al-Qamar 54:17), then its foundational structure must be intelligible to ordinary believers.

A universal revelation cannot depend upon advanced academic mediation for its core claims to be understood. While complex jurisprudence may develop, and modern political theory may attempt reconciliation or reinterpretation, the essential hierarchy described in the text is accessible: judgment belongs to God, divine words are unchangeable, believers may not selectively accept revelation, human authority operates within revealed limits.

Belief, as presented in the Qur’an, does not require engagement in modern constitutional theory. It requires submission to a revealed normative order. That structure is presented in the text in direct and comprehensible terms.

Conclusion

The Qur’an establishes binding legal norms in matters of inheritance, adjudication, economic conduct, and punishment. It differentiates between determinate and ambiguous verses, permitting interpretation while preserving foundational authority. It condemns partial acceptance of revelation, affirms the immutability of divine command, and repeatedly instructs believers to judge according to what God has sent down. It leaves institutional form open, but not ultimate legislative authority.

When secularism is defined as a legal-political order in which ultimate normative authority resides in autonomous human sovereignty, the Qur’anic structure described above is structurally incompatible with it. The incompatibility does not arise from political activism, historical circumstance, or ideological radicalism. It arises from the hierarchy embedded in the text itself: divine legislative supremacy and derivative human authority.

Under that structure, the source of binding law cannot be relocated to autonomous human will without altering the theological foundation of the system. The conclusion therefore follows analytically: secularism, understood as independent human legislative sovereignty, is incompatible with Qur’anic normative supremacy.