Strategic Uncertainty Is Now the Baseline of the Global Order

Strategic uncertainty has become the baseline condition under which global politics and economics operate. Power is more dispersed, trust more fragile and stability more conditional than at any time since the end of the Cold War.

This landscape begins with the structure of power. The international system has not settled into a stable multipolar balance, but into a form of strategic multipolarity defined by fluid alignments.

The US–China rivalry remains central, yet it no longer organises global politics on its own. India, Indonesia, Brazil, Türkiye and the Gulf states have emerged as autonomous actors with divergent interests. Europe seeks strategic autonomy while remaining dependent on American security. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has clarified geopolitical lines but exposed its limitations. Influence now flows through temporary coalitions rather than fixed blocs.

Strategic uncertainty is reinforced by the rise of geo-economic statecraft. Economic tools have become core instruments of power. The United States has built an architecture of export controls on advanced semiconductors, AI accelerators and lithography equipment. Outbound investment screening now targets capital flows into Chinese quantum and AI companies.

China has responded with measures of its own — controls on gallium, germanium and graphite exports, accelerated domestic technology substitution, and a concentrated effort to secure dominance in electric vehicles, batteries and grid technologies. Beijing’s industrial strategy is inseparable from its geopolitical ambitions.

Europe, too, has shifted. The Critical Raw Materials Act, new AI governance frameworks and a more assertive industrial security agenda mark a departure from earlier market-driven assumptions. Critical supply chains are now treated as strategic assets requiring political management.

Emerging economies are adopting similar tools. India’s semiconductor push, Brazil and Indonesia’s tightened control over minerals central to the green transition, and Gulf sovereign wealth funds’ expansive investments in AI, aerospace and hydrogen all reflect a global convergence around strategic industrial policy. Yet perhaps the clearest sign of the new order is the weakening of regional cooperation where it once seemed most resilient.

North America is a case in point. Instead of deeper integration, the region has experienced divergence. Under Trump, the US has pursued re-nationalisation of manufacturing, the return of tariff barriers and security-led industrial policy that often sidelines Canada and Mexico. The idea of a North American manufacturing ecosystem has given way to unilateralism. This shift supports a broader trend: globalisation has weakened, not advanced.

Trade continues, but the structure and meaning of globalisation have fundamentally changed. The era of broad, rules-based openness has given way to a system defined by conditional, politically filtered interdependence. Supply chains are being rewired not to maximise efficiency but to manage risk, reduce exposure and serve national security priorities. Friendshoring, nearshoring and strategic redundancies are the new organising principles. Cross-border flows persist, but the underlying trust that once sustained economic integration has eroded.

Technology now defines geopolitical hierarchy. Control over semiconductors, AI models, data infrastructures, grid technologies and critical minerals determines influence. Firms such as TSMC, ASML and major AI labs now shape global dependencies as directly as states do. Technological chokepoints have become strategic levers.

This environment has also ushered in the return of the interventionist state. Governments are steering capital, shaping industrial priorities and redefining the boundary between public purpose and private markets. The ideological divide between state and market has softened under the pressures of technology competition, climate imperatives and security concerns.

Strategic uncertainty is amplified further by the politics of vulnerability. Energy dependence, climate shocks, food insecurity and supply-chain concentration have become central variables in national strategy. Europe’s exposure to Russian gas, export bans on critical minerals and climate-driven disruptions demonstrate how vulnerabilities translate into geopolitical leverage. Vulnerability has become an organising principle of power.

The Global South has simultaneously gained greater autonomy. The expansion of BRICS, the diplomatic flexibility of the Gulf and the non-alignment of many African and Latin American states reflect a redistribution of agency. This is not a cohesive bloc but a competitive marketplace in which major powers must negotiate rather than dictate.

Meanwhile, institutions built after 1945 are struggling to adapt. The WTO’s dispute system is paralysed, the IMF faces legitimacy challenges and climate diplomacy increasingly relies on bilateral or minilateral arrangements. Multilateralism remains relevant but no longer structures the system.

The central challenge of the decade ahead is not anticipating a future transition but managing a global order already transformed. Strategic uncertainty is not a temporary disruption. It is the operating environment of international politics — and it will define the choices states make on climate, technology and economic resilience.