Destroying and Creating: The Transformation of Capitalism from Nietzsche to Schumpeter
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950) were two thinkers who worked in different periods and different disciplines. Following his severe mental collapse in 1889, Nietzsche was unable to continue his philosophical work. Schumpeter was only six years old at the time. Therefore, a personal encounter between the two thinkers was not possible. Nevertheless, there are philosophical affinities between Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch and Schumpeter’s understanding of creative destruction.
The relationship between the emergence of the new and the overcoming of the existing lies at the heart of this philosophical affinity. In Nietzsche, this involves questioning established values and creating new ones. In Schumpeter, it concerns economic innovations transforming existing modes of production and economic relations.
Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch finds expression in his work Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None), published between 1883 and 1885. Nietzsche returns to the concept in Ecce Homo: Wie man wird, was man ist (Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is), written in 1888 and published posthumously in 1908.
The Übermensch does not signify biological or racial superiority. It represents a philosophical ideal concerned with the individual’s capacity to overcome oneself and create new values. The questioning of established moral values, the revaluation of values, and the will to power (Wille zur Macht) form the backbone of Nietzsche’s thought. The human being is not a finished and unchanging entity. Self-overcoming requires individuals to reassess their relationship with existing values.
Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction seeks to explain the process of economic development under capitalism. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter explains that capitalism’s economic structure continually changes from within. As new products, production methods, markets, and forms of organization emerge, some existing economic activities lose their significance or disappear.
The entrepreneur stands at the centre of creative destruction. By carrying out new combinations (neue Kombinationen), the entrepreneur changes the structure of economic activity. Economic development thus takes on a dimension that goes far beyond a quantitative increase in existing production.
Schumpeter’s entrepreneur does not merely seek to use existing productive resources more efficiently. The entrepreneur develops new products, applies different production methods, enters new markets, or organizes production in different ways. These innovations, which Schumpeter calls new combinations, change the existing workings of the economy.
There is an affinity between Nietzsche’s Übermensch and Schumpeter’s entrepreneur. Neither thinker regards the existing order as unchangeable. Nietzsche criticizes herd morality and the unquestioning acceptance of established values. Schumpeter explains that economic development cannot be understood solely within existing conditions of equilibrium. In other words, market equilibrium is dynamic rather than static.
For Nietzsche, self-overcoming and the creation of new values constitute a philosophical problem. For Schumpeter, entrepreneurial innovations are activities that transform capitalism’s economic structure. An economically successful innovation does not necessarily create a morally better order. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur cannot be regarded as Nietzsche’s Übermensch simply because the entrepreneur produces innovations.
In Nietzsche, overcoming established values requires a revaluation of the values that guide human beings. Schumpeter’s creative destruction, meanwhile, does not mean chaos or social turmoil. It explains the transformation of capitalism’s economic structure through innovation. The social consequences of this transformation may be positive or negative.
The relationship between Nietzsche’s Übermensch and Schumpeter’s creative destruction allows us to explore the historical roots of ideas about change and creativity, examine the contradictions capitalism generates through its own development, and question whether technological progress means the same thing as human development.
What will this article seek to explain?
First, the intellectual affinities and fundamental differences between Nietzsche and Schumpeter will be considered within a historical framework. Connections extending from the understandings of change developed by Heraclitus, Goethe, Darwin, and Bergson to Werner Sombart’s studies of capitalism’s historical development will be examined. The discussion will then turn to how creative destruction can change the entrepreneur’s economic position and how capitalism can undermine the conditions of its own existence.
Most importantly, all these conceptual approaches and discussions will ultimately be used to shed light on the present. Through an examination of artificial intelligence, automation, the concentration of capital, and technology, the distinction between creativity and human self-overcoming will be assessed in light of contemporary conditions.
The Historical Roots of the Idea of Change
In exploring Nietzsche’s philosophical roots, we must also consider Heraclitus (c. 535–475 BCE). Heraclitus argued that the universe does not have a static order composed of unchanging entities. Change is one of the fundamental features of existence. The tension between opposites is inseparable from the workings of the world.
In Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen (Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks), Nietzsche draws strongly on Heraclitus’s understanding of change. He does not regard being as fixed and unchanging, and emphasizes the continuity of change.
In Schumpeter’s creative destruction, too, changes in the economic order are inherent in the workings of the system. New technologies replace old ones, and existing economic relations undergo change.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) is another important figure in tracing the history of the idea of change. The concept of Metamorphose (metamorphosis, transformation) occupies an important place in Goethe’s studies of nature. In Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären, published in 1790, Goethe argues that a plant’s different organs, such as leaves, sepals, and petals, do not develop independently of one another but emerge through transformations of the same underlying structure. In Goethe’s approach, nature does not consist of finished forms.
Nietzsche comments on Goethe in the section entitled “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” in Götzen-Dämmerung (Twilight of the Idols). Nietzsche describes Goethe as “a strong human being who sought to integrate the different aspects of life.”
Goethe is concerned with the transformation of organic forms. Schumpeter is concerned with changes in economic structures through innovation. Change is present in both approaches. Goethe and Schumpeter thus offer a point of connection between biology and economics.
Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and the theory of evolution must naturally also feature in discussions of change. In his 1859 work On the Origin of Species, Darwin explains that species are not immutable. Heritable variations exist among organisms. Through natural selection, certain heritable traits may become more widespread across generations. For Darwin, evolution does not necessarily mean arriving at a superior organism. A trait that provides an advantage under certain conditions may lose that advantage under others.
Nietzsche did not regard the human being as a finished entity. The human being was something to be overcome. Darwin explains biological change. Nietzsche treats the human capacity to overcome the values offered by society and create new ones as a philosophical question.
Nietzsche opposes the explanation of life solely in terms of efforts to preserve one’s existence and adapt to the environment. In Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil), he argues that the fundamental drive of living beings is not merely self-preservation.
In Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, John Richardson examines Nietzsche’s thought in relation to evolutionary approaches. Richardson argues that Nietzsche does not reject Darwin’s understanding of evolution in its entirety. Nietzsche accepts that living beings change over time. However, he opposes explaining life solely in terms of survival and adaptation to the environment. To understand the behaviour of living beings, their tendencies to gain power, develop, and overcome themselves must also be taken into account.
In Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, John Richardson examines Nietzsche’s thought in relation to evolutionary approaches. Richardson argues that Nietzsche does not reject Darwin’s understanding of evolution in its entirety. Nietzsche accepts that living beings change over time. However, he opposes explaining life solely in terms of survival and adaptation to the environment. To understand the behaviour of living beings, their tendencies to gain power, develop, and overcome themselves must also be taken into account.
Evolution is also important in Schumpeter’s thought. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, he defines capitalism as, by its nature, a form or method of economic change. The emergence of new products, production methods, markets, and forms of organization changes the economic structure. Creative destruction is a natural process within this transformation. All this change takes place through the capitalist system’s own internal dynamics.
Darwin is concerned with natural selection, while Schumpeter is concerned with entrepreneurial innovations. In biological evolution, the emergence of heritable variations can be distinguished from their spread through natural selection. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur implements new combinations through deliberate economic actions. For this reason, Schumpeter’s understanding of evolution should not be regarded as a direct application of Darwin’s theory to economics. Nevertheless, the two offer a useful opportunity for comparison that helps us better understand their concepts.
Henri Bergson (1859–1941) approaches the philosophical problems raised by Darwin’s theory of evolution from another perspective. Published in 1907, Bergson’s L’Évolution créatrice (Creative Evolution) seeks to explain the development of life without reducing it to mechanical relations of cause and effect. At this point, the connection between Bergson and Schumpeter deserves particular attention and careful examination in relation to the increasingly mechanistic character of economics.
Bergson maintains that life does not advance towards a predetermined outcome. The new is neither a repetition of past conditions nor the realization of a prearranged plan. Bergson, therefore, rejects both approaches that explain life entirely through mechanical processes and views that hold that evolution moves towards a predetermined purpose.
The concept of durée (duration) occupies a central place in Bergson’s thought. Beyond time measured by the clock, duration describes a process of change and transformation in which the past continues to live in the present and the future remains undetermined. Time is not merely a sequence of independent moments placed side by side.
This approach is close to Nietzsche’s thinking on change. For both thinkers, life cannot be explained in terms of a finished and unchanging being. Nietzsche speaks of the individual’s self-overcoming and creation of values. Bergson, in turn, discusses the creative development of life and the nature of time.
Bergson’s concept of élan vital (vital impetus) is also important in this context. Bergson uses this concept to explain the creative movement of life. He argues that the development of living beings cannot be explained solely through physical and biological relations of cause and effect. Evolution produces novelties that cannot be predicted in advance.
There is also an affinity between Schumpeter’s understanding of economic development and Bergson’s creative evolution. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur does not merely seek to use existing productive resources more efficiently. By carrying out new combinations, the entrepreneur changes the workings of the economic system.
In Schumpeter’s Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (The Theory of Economic Development), published in 1911, economic development is explained through changes occurring within the economy itself. The entrepreneur moves beyond the established workings of the existing economic order, developing new products, production methods, markets, sources of raw materials, or forms of organization.
Bergson is concerned with the creative development of life. Schumpeter, meanwhile, is concerned with entrepreneurial innovations. Bergson explores the philosophical nature of life and time. Schumpeter explains the mechanisms that transform capitalism’s economic structure.
Heraclitus, Goethe, Darwin, and Bergson explain change in different ways: change and opposites in Heraclitus, metamorphosis in Goethe, natural selection in Darwin, and the creative development of life in Bergson. These approaches do not, of course, share the same theoretical foundation. They do, however, show how different fields address the questions of how change occurs and under what conditions the new emerges. Nietzsche and Schumpeter can be considered within this broad spectrum of historical and philosophical thought.
Werner Sombart: An Intellectual Link from Nietzsche to Schumpeter
To explore the relationship between the Übermensch and creative destruction, it is essential to consult the work of the German economist and sociologist Werner Sombart (1863–1941).
Sombart is one of the leading representatives of the German Historical School, which examined the historical development of capitalism. In Der Moderne Kapitalismus (Modern Capitalism), published in 1902, he examines how modes of production, economic institutions, and social relations change over time. For Sombart, capitalism is not an economic system governed by unchanging rules. It is a social order that emerged under particular historical conditions and has itself undergone transformation as those conditions have changed.
Sombart’s work allows a connection to be drawn between Nietzsche’s ideas about overcoming existing values and creating new ones and Schumpeter’s understanding of economic development.
In their study of the history of the idea of creative destruction, Hugo Reinert and Erik S. Reinert draw attention to the intellectual affinities between Nietzsche, Sombart, and Schumpeter. The importance Sombart attaches to destruction and renewal in explaining capitalism’s development can be regarded as one of the intellectual precursors to the process Schumpeter would later call creative destruction. However, this affinity does not mean that the three thinkers used the same concept or that Schumpeter derived his concept directly from Sombart.
In Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (The Theory of Economic Development), published in 1911, Schumpeter had explained the entrepreneur’s role in economic development. By developing new products, applying different production methods, entering new markets, or reorganizing production, the entrepreneur changed the existing workings of the economy. Schumpeter called these innovations new combinations (neue Kombinationen). However, the expression creative destruction acquired its conceptual identity with the publication of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy in 1942.
Sombart, too, examines capitalism’s development through the emergence of new economic activities and their replacement of older ones. As new production methods, energy sources, and forms of economic organization develop, previously important activities may decline. The disappearance of old structures is intertwined with capitalism’s development.
Sombart gives concrete expression to this approach in Krieg und Kapitalismus (War and Capitalism), published in 1913. The intensive exploitation of European forests led to wood shortages in some regions. Constraints on the supply of wood, together with other conditions, increased the importance of alternative fuels. The spread of coal use and the use of coke in iron production created new opportunities to expand production. Some productive activities that had previously depended on wood could thus be sustained using different energy sources. This historical transformation, which Sombart presents as an example, illustrates how important changes in existing conditions of production can be to capitalism’s development.
At this point, an important finding must be emphasized. Sombart did not previously define Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction by the same name. An academic study published in 2026 examining Krieg und Kapitalismus states that Sombart did not use the expression schöpferische Zerstörung (creative destruction), which has become closely associated with Schumpeter. Sombart’s contribution lies in considering the decline of old economic activities together with the emergence of new ones in his account of capitalism’s development.
Schumpeter values Sombart’s historical research and his questions about capitalism’s transformation, but criticizes his work for its lack of theoretical clarity and analytical precision. Schumpeter’s 1927 assessment of Sombart brings the methodological differences between the two economists to light. Listed in the bibliography of Schumpeter’s works, this assessment has also been examined in subsequent research on the relationship between the two thinkers.
Sombart’s works show that the idea of destruction and creation occurring together in capitalism’s development was discussed before Schumpeter. Schumpeter went beyond this historical observation to explain how economic change emerges. The role he assigned to the entrepreneur, innovation, and the transformation of existing production structures made creative destruction a highly important part of an economic theory of how capitalism works.
The intellectual connection extending from Nietzsche through Sombart to Schumpeter approaches change in terms of destruction and creation. Yet their starting points are entirely different.
The Übermensch and the Entrepreneur: Two Different Meanings of Creativity
Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is not necessarily the owner of a business or the person providing capital. A manager, employee, or founder of a business may also perform the entrepreneurial function when bringing a new economic activity into being. Entrepreneurship is defined by the implementation of economic innovation, rather than by a person’s wealth or social position.
Schumpeter’s entrepreneur changes the structure of economic activity. New products, production methods, and businesses emerge, while older ones may lose their significance. An innovation may generate profits for the entrepreneur, increase production, or offer consumers new possibilities. However, the same innovation may also cause some businesses to close, workers to lose their jobs, or certain occupations to disappear. The fact that creative destruction brings economic development does not mean that its social consequences will be positive for everyone. The unequal distribution of the gains from technological change across different sections of society is one reason income inequality can increase during periods of growth.
The Übermensch is not defined by economic success. The Übermensch overcomes established values and creates new ones. This is Nietzsche’s ideal of the human being. From this perspective, a successful entrepreneur cannot be considered Nietzsche’s Übermensch merely for introducing innovations. Nietzsche’s idea of the Übermensch is not an ideal founded on entrepreneurship or economic success.
In Nietzsche, overcoming established values concerns the questions of how one should live and what meaning one should give to one’s life. In Schumpeter, the replacement of old modes of production by new ones is part of capitalism’s process of economic development. In one, human values and the purposes of life change, and, in the other, the organization of economic activity changes.
There is an important difference between Nietzsche and Schumpeter concerning time. In Nietzsche, self-overcoming is not a process completed through a particular achievement. Individuals can continually reassess their values and their lives. In Schumpeter, entrepreneurship is defined by the implementation of particular innovations. When an entrepreneur introduces a new production method, economic change begins. Once the new method becomes widespread and an ordinary part of production, continuing the same activity no longer means performing the entrepreneurial function.
In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter argues that innovations can increasingly be produced systematically through the research and development activities of large businesses. Innovations previously pioneered by individual entrepreneurs may become the outcome of work undertaken by specialists and large organizations. Thus, economic innovation may continue while the individual entrepreneur’s importance within capitalism declines.
The development Schumpeter highlights makes the distinction between the Übermensch and the entrepreneur clearer. In Nietzsche, human self-overcoming concerns the individual’s capacity to create their own values. In Schumpeter, capitalism’s development makes it possible for economic innovations to be implemented increasingly independently of the individual entrepreneur. Creativity does not disappear. However, it may become part of the routine activities of large businesses and specialized organizations.
There is undoubtedly a strong affinity between the two thinkers in terms of changing existing conditions and creating something new. However, there are important differences concerning the meaning of creativity and its historical development. The Übermensch is a philosophical ideal. The entrepreneur is an actor whose role can change as capitalism develops.
Nietzsche’s Nihilism and Schumpeter’s Thesis of Capitalism’s Dissolution
Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism concerns the loss of validity of established values. The death of God in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science) provides a basis not only for understanding the decline of religious belief but also for questioning the values on which European thought rests.
For Schumpeter, capitalism’s success can create conditions that make it harder for the system to sustain its own existence. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy also explains how capitalism’s success can gradually weaken the social and institutional structures that sustain it. The institutionalization of entrepreneurship as large firms develop, and the transformation of innovation from an individual entrepreneur’s activity into the routine operations of large organizations, are parts of this process.
According to Schumpeter, capitalism’s development not only institutionalizes entrepreneurship but also weakens the traditional social foundations of private property. As large corporations become more widespread, ownership and management grow further apart. Meanwhile, the educational opportunities created by capitalism contribute to the growth of intellectual groups critical of the system. Thus, capitalism’s success does not automatically secure the system’s social and political legitimacy.
In Nietzsche, established values can lose their validity within their own historical conditions. In Schumpeter, capitalism’s development can weaken the institutions on which capitalism rests. Nietzsche’s analysis of nihilism concerns the historical crisis of values in Western thought. Schumpeter’s thesis of dissolution rests on the social and institutional consequences of capitalism’s economic development. Their common ground is that the foundations of an order can erode over time.
Nietzsche addresses a philosophical problem concerning the legitimacy of values. Schumpeter considers the social and political consequences of capitalism’s success. This distinction carries highly important implications for contemporary capitalism.
Technological development may accelerate. However, institutions and social values may change at uneven rates.
Historical Time and the Transformation of Capitalism
Bergson’s understanding of duration (durée) and Braudel’s concept of the long term (longue durée) address different aspects of time. Bergson examines the experience of time and the continuity of change from a philosophical perspective. Braudel shows that historical change occurs at different speeds. The two thinkers’ approaches do not share the same theoretical foundation. However, considering the two concepts together can help us analyse Schumpeter’s creative destruction in terms of the continuity of change and its historical consequences, without confining it to the moments when technological innovations emerge.
Fernand Braudel (1902–1985) is one of the leading representatives of the Annales School. In his 1958 article “Histoire et sciences sociales: La longue durée” (“History and the Social Sciences: The Long Term”), he explains that historical change occurs at different speeds. Political events, economic fluctuations, and transformations in social structures do not proceed on the same timescale. Some events unfold within a few days, while certain economic and social relations persist for centuries.
In Braudel’s approach, history is not the sum of successive events. Present conditions are shaped by the influence of institutions, modes of production, geographical conditions, and social relations inherited from the past.
Schumpeter’s creative destruction also allows economic change to be examined across different timescales. A new technology may be developed within a short period. However, its diffusion into production, the replacement of existing firms by new ones, the acquisition of new skills by the workforce, and changes in economic institutions may take longer.
Schumpeter’s theory and Braudel’s understanding of history complement one another. Schumpeter explains the mechanism that changes capitalism’s economic structure. Braudel helps us understand how this transformation unfolds over different historical timescales.
In Schumpeter, innovation and the entrepreneur stand at the centre of economic change. In Braudel, capitalism’s historical development is examined alongside trade networks, states, financial relations, and the concentration of economic power. In particular, in Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe–XVIIIe siècle (Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century), he does not equate capitalism with the market economy. He investigates capitalism’s relationship with large accumulations of capital, privileges, and the concentration of economic power.
Artificial Intelligence, Creative Destruction, and Technological Monopolization
The development of artificial intelligence technologies is one of the contemporary manifestations of Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction. New products, services, and business models are emerging with artificial intelligence.
Schumpeter’s approach to new combinations, developed in Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, published in 1911, becomes important here. Artificial intelligence could affect several forms of innovation simultaneously. New production methods are emerging in software development, scientific research, logistics, financial analysis, and healthcare.
Automation can lead to capital replacing labour in certain tasks. However, technological development can also create new tasks that require human labour. The overall effect on employment depends on how these two processes develop together.
As new technologies replace old firms, should we expect economic power to keep changing hands? Or can innovation itself further increase the economic power of certain firms?
In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter also examines the relationship of large firms and market power to innovation. He emphasizes the importance of competition arising from new products, new technologies, and new forms of organization.
Schumpeter’s creative destruction does not rest on an understanding of competition that requires a large number of small firms in every market. Large firms can also be important actors in innovation.
Today, network effects, data accumulation, high initial costs, and the costs users incur when switching to other services can allow certain firms to maintain their market power in digital platforms. In artificial intelligence, access to advanced computing capacity, large data centres, financing, and distribution channels can be important conditions for competition. These conditions may make it harder for new firms to enter the market. Economic power may become concentrated in the hands of a small number of firms even as innovation continues.
Today, the market power of large technology firms and the barriers facing new competitors constitute an important issue. Similarly, the relationship between competition and innovation is not always linear under all conditions.
Creative destruction cannot be explained solely by the emergence of technological innovations. Who develops these innovations, the economic conditions under which they are used, and how market power is distributed also matter.
Braudel did not explain the history of capitalism solely through the development of free competition. The relationships large economic actors establish with states, the privileges they obtain, and their power over markets should also be considered within the framework of creative destruction.
The economic transformation brought about by artificial intelligence technologies can be assessed through both Schumpeter’s creative destruction and Braudel’s understanding of capitalism. While Schumpeter explains how new technologies change the economic structure, Braudel offers a framework for investigating how economic power is historically formed and maintained.
The Übermensch and Artificial Intelligence
Schumpeter’s creative destruction helps us understand how artificial intelligence changes capitalism’s production structure. The Übermensch allows us to question whether technological development is the same as human self-overcoming.
The Übermensch is not a technologically more advanced human being. Possessing more knowledge, calculating faster, or solving more complex problems does not mean attaining Nietzsche’s ideal of the Übermensch. The Übermensch is an ideal concerned with the human capacity to question inherited values and create new ones.
Artificial intelligence can produce better results than humans in certain tasks. However, this does not mean that self-overcoming in Nietzsche’s sense has occurred. There is no necessary connection between technological progress and human self-overcoming. What a technology can do and the values that guide people in using it are different matters.
In Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morality), Nietzsche investigates the historical origins of moral values. He rejects the acceptance of values as immutable and ahistorical truths. Artificial intelligence, too, prompts human beings to reassess their established assumptions about knowledge, labour, creativity, and decision-making. Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch offers a way to avoid equating technological development with human development.
Automation, Labour, and the Social Consequences of Creative Destruction
Schumpeter’s creative destruction explains the disappearance of existing production methods and the emergence of new ones. However, the effects of this transformation on workers must also be examined.
While automation replaces labour in some tasks, it complements labour in others. Technological development has effects that both reduce and increase the demand for labour. However, the creation of new tasks and the disappearance of old ones may not occur at the same pace. The technical and social consequences of creative destruction can therefore diverge. Some workers’ incomes may decline even as production increases. While new sectors develop, unemployment and economic decline may emerge in older industrial regions.
Schumpeter’s concept explains that this transformation arises from the workings of capitalism. However, explaining how the costs of transformation are distributed within society requires an examination of wage formation, education, social security, and economic power relations.
At this point, Braudel’s long-term approach becomes important. As technological change accelerates, educational institutions, occupational skills, and social security systems may not change at the same pace. Differences in the timing of change across these areas will affect the social consequences of creative destruction.
Nietzsche’s Last Man and Technological Comfort
One of the important figures Nietzsche places in opposition to the Übermensch is the last man (der letzte Mensch). In the prologue to Also sprach Zarathustra – Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen, the last man represents a human type who has lost the desire for self-overcoming and prioritizes comfort and security. Great aspirations and the desire to create new values give way to satisfaction with existing living conditions. This concept allows us to open a discussion about contemporary technological developments.
Artificial intelligence and automation can enable people to carry out certain activities with less effort. Technologies used in everyday life can be observed to provide comfort. However, greater technological comfort does not necessarily mean that human intellectual and creative capacities will develop. Delegating certain activities to technology can change people’s relationships with those activities.
Nietzsche’s last man can also be used as an argument against technological development. Throughout history, technological developments have provoked social resistance. Such resistance has sometimes prevented certain technologies from being used in particular areas. However, restricting the use of a technology and stopping technological development altogether are not the same thing. Viewed from this perspective, the last man can be regarded as a concept for questioning the relationship between technological progress and human purposes and values.
While Nietzsche’s Übermensch seeks to overcome existing values, the last man seeks a safe and comfortable life within existing conditions. This opposition allows conceptual, and therefore philosophical, comparisons to be made when questioning the direction in which technological development is transforming human beings.
Does Creative Destruction Also Transform Human Beings?
Nietzsche and Schumpeter were two thinkers who pursued different questions. Their affinity lies in their refusal to regard the existing order as unchangeable and in the importance they attach to the emergence of the new.
Creative destruction explains how capitalism’s development changes old modes of production, businesses, and economic relations. In this process, productive capacity may expand, new needs may be met, and previously impossible activities may become possible. However, the concept of creative destruction alone cannot explain who gains access to the opportunities created by economic development or the purposes for which they are used.
Schumpeter himself shows that capitalism’s development does more than create new productive possibilities. As innovation becomes part of the routine activities of large businesses, the position of the individual entrepreneur can change. Capitalism’s success can weaken the social and institutional foundations that sustain the system. There is no necessary connection between economic development and capitalism’s social legitimacy.
With today’s artificial intelligence technologies, people can access more information, perform more complex operations, and quickly complete activities that previously required considerable time. However, an increase in what human beings can do does not mean that their capacity to determine the purposes of their own lives and question their values has developed to the same extent.
Technology may make it easier for a person to perform a particular task. However, assessing why one performs that task, what purpose one wishes to achieve, and what that purpose means to oneself is an entirely different matter. Technology can provide certain conveniences. But how does the use of technology change people’s opportunities to think, question, and make their own decisions?
Easier access to information may allow people to encounter previously inaccessible ideas, learn new things, and devote more time to creative activities. On the other hand, the same technologies may also lead to certain mental activities being delegated to systems. As technical capacity increases, the individual’s need to exercise their intellectual abilities may decline. Which tendency prevails may depend on the technology itself, as well as on how it is used and the social conditions under which it becomes widespread.
While the Übermensch represents the possibility of questioning the values one is offered and creating new ones, the last man describes a human type content with the comfort and security provided by existing living conditions. Greater technological comfort does not necessarily turn a person into the last man. It does, however, help us reflect on the difference between living more comfortably and questioning the purposes of life. At this point, a personal decision must be made. In the face of technologies that are developing and affecting our lives, will we become Nietzsche’s Übermensch or his last man?
This decision also has an economic dimension. The development and use of artificial intelligence have become dependent on large accumulations of capital, advanced infrastructure, and powerful organizations. While technological possibilities are expanding, another reality is that control over these possibilities is becoming concentrated in the hands of a limited number of organizations. As people’s capacity to benefit from technology increases, their opportunities to determine the direction of its development do not expand to the same extent.
Capitalism’s production of new technologies does not mean that people can create their own values or have a greater say over the purposes of their lives.
Technological development cannot be examined solely through changes associated with productivity gains, growth, or the emergence of new products. Economics cannot concern itself only with these subjects. Under what conditions do societies benefit from the possibilities technology offers? To what extent can societies influence the consequences of technological change? Can societies freely make decisions about their own lives?
Nietzsche and Schumpeter must be read anew today, from fresh perspectives. How does capitalism destroy existing economic structures and create new ones? To what extent can human beings overcome themselves and direct their own lives within this transformation?
The answer to the first question does not automatically provide the answer to the second. It is precisely here that the fundamental distinction between capitalism’s creative destruction and human self-overcoming lies.
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